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
BUILDING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS(PSYOP) INTO THE  
OPERATIONAL COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION(CES)

by

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The contents of the paper reflect my own personal views and are  
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the Navy.



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*Abstract of*

**BUILDING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS(PSYOP) INTO THE OPERATIONAL  
COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION(CES)**

Psychological Operations(PSYOP) provide combatant commanders with a force enhancement capability across the full military operational spectrum--from peace to crisis to war. Numerous lessons learned from the Gulf War and other recent Military Operations Other than War(MOOTW) emphasize that early, centralized planning at the highest levels form the prerequisite for effective PSYOP implementation at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of warfare. The central planning instrument for initial mission analysis and Course of Action(COA) selection is the Commander's Estimate of the Situation(CES). Presently, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System(JOPES) broadly addresses PSYOP in both deliberate and crisis action planning. However, this doctrine fails to provide direct guidance on how to include PSYOP with all other force considerations throughout the CES. Operational planners often apply PSYOP in a "shot-gun" approach at the end of the CES process. This application of PSYOP as a late or "stand-alone" force or weapon system fails to incorporate the full potential PSYOP brings to the operational commander's arsenal. In contrast, PSYOP must be analyzed and compared with other force assets at the beginning of this planning process. Therefore, integrating PSYOP directly into the CES provides the combatant commander with a well planned and synergized decision in time of peace or crisis.

PSYOP can erode an enemy's will before the commitment of combat forces as well as facilitate humanitarian relief missions and the reconstitution of societies following conflicts. Economical yet very effective, it is extraordinarily adaptable in various regions and across diverse cultural and ethnic groups. To be efficacious in conflicts, PSYOP must be included in planning at the highest level from the outset...more than simply leaflets and loudspeakers, PSYOP in the final analysis can provide the warfighting CINC with an extremely imaginative and versatile force multiplier.<sup>1</sup>

### **THESIS:**

Psychological Operations(PSYOP) provide combatant commanders with a unique force multiplier across the full spectrum of military operations. However, in order to realize this force enhancement capability, PSYOP must be integrated directly into the Commander's Estimate of the Situation(CES). Therefore, analyzing PSYOP capabilities and limitations at every step in the CES provides the combatant commander with a well planned and synergized decision in time of peace or crisis.

### **BACKGROUND:**

Today's sophistication of weapon systems and information technology has focused our national leadership on the term "Information Warfare(IW)". The physical application of IW in a military environment is defined as Command and Control Warfare(C2W). C2W disrupts the enemy Command and Control(C2) structure by denying enemy C2 capabilities and protecting friendly C2 capabilities. Operational C2W uses Psychological Operations(PSYOP), Military Deception(MILDEC), Electronic Warfare(EW), Operational Security(OPSEC), and

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<sup>1</sup>Jeffrey B. Jones and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995, 28.

Physical Destruction to meet this challenge.<sup>2</sup> Of these, PSYOP offers the most robust applicability to the entire military continuum from peace to Military Operations Other Than War(MOOTW) to war.

Joint Doctrine broadly defines PSYOP as "operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations groups and individuals."<sup>3</sup> Essentially, PSYOP, executed at the operational level, is designed to target foreign audiences and promote the mission effectiveness of the combatant commander's campaigns and strategies. Currently, PSYOP planning and execution originates at the strategic level in the form of the Defense Planning Guidance(DPG) which states the basic defense policy for PSYOP. Based on this DPG, current intelligence, and present capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) produce the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan(JSCP), which contains a PSYOP annex(Annex D). At the theater/operational level, PSYOP planning takes place in both the Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning(CAP) process via the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System(JOPES). Deliberate planning, conducted during peacetime with an 18-24 month lead time, relies heavily on military and political assumptions in order to construct joint operation plans based on predicted conditions and resources allocated for planning purposes. In contrast, CAP provides a more flexible and responsive plan for actual contingencies based on current events.<sup>4</sup> The earliest

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<sup>2</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare(C2W)*, Joint Pub 3-13.1 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 7 February 1996), I-4.

<sup>3</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 10 July 1996), v.

<sup>4</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, Joint

and most critical PSYOP planning node central to both deliberate and crisis planning is the Commander's Estimate of the Situation(CES).

Recent U.S. involvement in Somalia, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War produced many crucial PSYOP lessons learned for joint military planners. First, in the age of smaller Defense budgets, decreasing deployments, and declining force structure, PSYOP provides a low cost and high-impact force multiplier.<sup>5</sup> Second, PSYOP requires synergy of combined, joint, and multi-agency assets. Third, PSYOP is critical to military operations and is the "inherent responsibility of every commander."<sup>6</sup> Fourth, PSYOP planning must be centralized at the highest levels due to the operational and strategic roles to the CINC's. Fifth, early integration of PSYOP in the contingency process is crucial.<sup>7</sup> Finally, General Schwarzkopf incorporates the importance of PSYOP in the commander's mission planning process:

Psychological operations are going to be absolutely a critical, critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in.

-- General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT, 20 Dec 90 <sup>8</sup>

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Pub 5-0 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 13 April 1995), ix.

<sup>5</sup>Jones and Mathews, 29.

<sup>6</sup>Jones and Mathews, 33.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations in Panama during Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY*, (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: March 1994), 33.

<sup>8</sup>U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations during DESERT SHIELD/STORM: A Post Operational Analysis*, (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: n.d.), 4-1.

The joint military community has made progress at incorporating many of the above PSYOP lessons learned into doctrine. Specifically, revised joint PSYOP publications, reorganized PSYOP C2 structure, and streamlined PSYOP approval authority criteria all serve to boost the awareness of PSYOP capability and limitations toward mission planning. Additionally, the assignment of career PSYOP officers to the CINC J-3(Operations) staff further enables an operational commander to integrate PSYOP assets. This buildup of the PSYOP's corporate knowledge base is commendable. However, this alone will not prevent planners from applying a "shot-gun" approach as a "stand-alone" weapon system--nor will this effort prevent the staff J-3 from completing a CES and asking the PSYOP staff officer for a last minute "chop"(review). The PSYOP plan should be incorporated within the CES itself, "...not buried in a seldom-read annex or appendix."<sup>9</sup> Not until PSYOP is completely integrated into earliest and highest level of planning (the CES) will the operational commander assure a completely synergized effort toward a chosen COA.

In order to effectively integrate PSYOP into the CES, a military commander must analyze each major step from Mission Analysis to the Decision from a PSYOP perspective. The objective of this action is a synergized CES vice a stand alone PSYOP CES. For clarity, the Naval War College CES template will be used to discuss PSYOP considerations within the CES.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Jeffrey B. Jones, "Theater Information Strategies," *Military Review*, November 1994, 48.

<sup>10</sup>JMO Department, "Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Worksheet", NWC 4111, Unpublished Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: July 1996.

### **MISSION ANALYSIS (Step 1):**

CINC's produce an annual overt peacetime PSYOP plan(OP3) within their geographic area of responsibility.<sup>11</sup> The key towards incorporating PSYOP into the mission analysis lies first in reviewing what foreign audiences and themes are presently being targeted(if any) to meet the CINC's peacetime strategy. Next, broadly categorize the type of mission anticipated - even prior to task assessment. PSYOP doctrine defines conflict in three categories: MOOTW(without the threat of force), MOOTW(with the threat of force) and war.<sup>12</sup> Once the type of mission is determined, planners should focus on task assessment.

Task assessment provides the primary filter for incorporating PSYOP into the overall mission plan. Based on the nature of the specific contingency, the superior's mission may yield a specific "stand-alone" PSYOP objective as a "specified task." However, if PSYOP is not specifically addressed in the superior's order, operational planners must look thoroughly at the stated "purpose" to incorporate any PSYOP "implied tasks" which could support (e.g. piggy back) primary(non-PSYOP) stated missions. Although slightly varied from the normal CES sequence, analyzing the "purpose" provides planners with possible hidden PSYOP implied tasks. Additionally, the "purpose" should also provide the attitude desired for the enemy populace in the military "end-state." Furthermore, PSYOP implied tasks may provide the only acceptable method of progressing through a "post-hostilities" scenario as well. This situation is highly applicable to MOOTW scenarios.

PSYOP, by definition, focuses on influencing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences. Accordingly, at this stage of the CES, each PSYOP "implied" or

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<sup>11</sup>Joint Pub 3-53, IV-4.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., V-2.



"specified" task essentially equates to a "target audience." Associated with each "target audience" is an "objective" which states the desired perceptions and/or behaviors sought of that target audience.<sup>13</sup> The "target audience" can still be carried through as an "essential task" along with non-PSYOP tasks. Recent contingencies provide examples of how planners translate "mission" and "purpose" into PSYOP "target audiences" and "objectives" sought.

In Operation Restore Hope, PSYOP specified/implied tasks included legitimization of the UN and military efforts, encouragement of Somali refugees to return to their homes, and relief effort support.<sup>14</sup> Some of the PSYOP implied tasks derived from USCENTCOM's "mission" and "purpose" in Desert Shield/Desert Storm/Urban Freedom include: (1) provide acceptance and support for U.S. operations; (2) intimidation of Iraqi forces; (3) encouragement of friendly states to resist aggression; and (4) desertion and defection of Iraqi troops.<sup>15</sup>

Many PSYOP "Restraint" and "Constraint" considerations are similar to non-PSYOP efforts. Time, for example, is a major consideration. The ability to change foreign attitudes or perceptions may take weeks instead of hours. Additionally, the physical limitations imposed on PSYOP dissemination assets also bear review. However, some new "PSYOP-specific" factors also create additional "constraints." First, all PSYOP efforts require approval authority from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict(ASD SO/LIC) or the National

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<sup>13</sup>Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*, FM 33-1-1, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 5 May 1994), 4-4.

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Army Combined Arms Command(CAC), *Operation Restore Hope: Lessons Learned Report*, (Kansas: n.p., n.d.), IX-4.

<sup>15</sup>Jeffrey B. Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom," *Special Warfare*, July 1994, 23.

Command Authority(NCA).<sup>16</sup> While the time required for approval during Desert Shield was months, recent operations in Restore Hope reduced approval time to a few days.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, most PSYOP related actions require Host Nation Support(HN) coordination and/or approval prior to activation.<sup>18</sup> Planners must consider the potential for having to integrate into less sophisticated media equipment normally found in lesser developed countries of the world.<sup>19</sup> Finally, accessibility of potential audiences may be constrained as well. Physical incompatibility or policy restrictions may place target audiences outside of military PSYOP capability.<sup>20</sup>

Rules of Engagement(ROE) considerations for PSYOP can be equated to the legal and political factors bounding PSYOP employment. In many cases PSYOP ROE may be harder to define than combat ROE. Planners must ensure PSYOP follow U.S. and international law especially in the case of offensive PSYOP measures(task this to the staff JAG).<sup>21</sup>

Finally, "planning assumptions" must also incorporate large scale PSYOP issues. PSYOP assumptions may include: (1) whether the population will be friendly/hostile; or (2) whether PSYOP employment will be permitted. At this stage of the CES, the operational planner must synergize both PSYOP and non-PSYOP

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<sup>16</sup>Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations*, FM 33-1, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 18 February 1994), C-1.

<sup>17</sup>Jones and Mathews, 31.

<sup>18</sup>Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom," 28.

<sup>19</sup>Joint Pub 3-53, VI-4.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 1-3.

<sup>21</sup>FM 31-1, 1-5.

analysis and state the Commander's Initial Intent incorporating the newly developed PSYOP "target audiences" (essential tasks) and associated "objectives."

#### **CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING COURSES OF ACTION (Step 2A):**

Understanding the characteristics within the Area of Operations(AO) is extremely important for PSYOP applications. The operational planner must focus on people oriented issues as well as terrain oriented issues. In addition to intelligence data provided by the intelligence community(J-2), the planner must also use his PSYOP staff to obtain inherent PSYOP community intelligence sources. This intel gathering action is often referred to as "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield(IPB)." <sup>22</sup> A PSYOP-specific application of this process correlates the following elements: (1) Climate and weather analysis; (2) Operational area evaluation; (3) Demographic evaluation; and (4) Geographic analysis. <sup>23</sup>

Climate and weather analysis focus on wind direction, wind speed and seasonal changes which affect PSYOP media and dissemination techniques. Although tactical in nature, weather can affect an overall PSYOP media and program campaign selection.

An Operational Area Evaluation(OAE) is a data analysis of region-oriented PSYOP-specific studies. These studies are compiled into one of three formats; Basic PSYOP Studies(BPS), Special PSYOP Studies(SPS), and Special PSYOP Assessments(SPA). <sup>24</sup> The BPS describes the most recent PSYOP-pertinent characteristics of a country, region, or geographical area. The BPS should be the

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<sup>22</sup>FM 33-1-1, 5-6.

<sup>23</sup>FM 33-1, 8-5.

<sup>24</sup>FM 33-1-1, D-1.

first reference reviewed when PSYOP are possible. Although similar to the BPS, the SPS focuses either on a single topic (e.g. German people through the world) or a specific aspect of a BPS (e.g. a township or precinct).<sup>25</sup> The SPA updates existing portions of a SPS or BPS and should be used with these documents for contingency planning.<sup>26</sup> These assets are critical for the operational planner to incorporate within this PSYOP-specific portion of the CES.

Demographic evaluation incorporates population studies targeting the demographic, cultural, economic, social, religious, political, and historical factors within the AO.<sup>27</sup> Note that much of this PSYOP-specific information requirement can be directed to the J-2 via the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements(PIR).

Geographic terrain studies evaluate the geographical effects on population density, product dissemination, and culture. Similar to weather analysis, mountain ranges, rivers, and valleys tend to have a large impact on the tactical application of PSYOP plans.<sup>28</sup>

PSYOP-specific intelligence requirements can be extremely burdensome without directed analysis. The Psychological Operations Automated Data System(POADS) provides one of two informational data bases available for PSYOP-specific data requests. Additionally, the Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System(SOCRATES) provides a

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 5-7.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

USSOCOM-sponsored intelligence data, voice, secondary imagery and FAX worldwide data base for accessing PSYOP-related issues.<sup>29</sup>

As described above, the intelligence gathering process for PSYOP is just as immense as that of regular mission requests. However, the actual intelligence data is quite different focusing on human motivations, actions, and perceptions. These items are significant to the operational planner considering possible PSYOP related objectives.

Relative combat power applied to PSYOP can be subjectively analyzed from both a "strengths" and "combat efficiency" determination between own, friendly and enemy forces when the threat of opposing combat units are projected. The sheer numbers and capabilities of own and friendly PSYOP assets over enemy assets can yield battle field advantages(e.g. combat efficiency). Note, however, that "Failure to use PSYOP may mean defeat, but the use of bad or amateurish PSYOP may be equally dangerous."<sup>30</sup> For MOOTW scenarios not involving the threat of force, a planner can view combat efficiency as "worker efficiency." Finally, after the various strengths and weaknesses (weighted toward PSYOP capability) are compared, the operational planner now focuses on enemy capabilities from a PSYOP perspective.

#### **ENEMY CAPABILITIES (Step 2B):**

From a PSYOP perspective, Enemy Capabilities(EC) refer to the enemy's capability to conduct PSYOP against own and/or allied forces. In C2W terminology,

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 5-8.

<sup>30</sup>Michael W. Totten, "US Army Psychological Operations and the Reserves," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2 May 1983, 28.

this analysis can be termed as a form of "C2 protect."<sup>31</sup> For a highly trained and disciplined U.S. military force, this threat appears low and is often neglected by operational planners. This assumption appears to have been validated during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM(DS/DS) in which Iraqi propaganda "warned U.S. military personnel that while they were away in the desert their wives were fooling around with movie stars such as Bart Simpson!"<sup>32</sup> However, this "cocky" approach to planning is immature and must be avoided. For example, today's technology offers potential enemy access to the most updated forms of communication technology and are not limited to modern and industrialized nations. These low-cost, highly capable, and easily accessible communication resources could be used in a misinformation campaign against U.S. or coalition members as well as block U.S. PSYOP efforts.<sup>33</sup>

The determination for a PSYOP-related EC is highly dependent on the J-2's intelligence estimate which usually contains both a situation analysis section and an EC section. The sources for the PSYOP-specific intelligence are similar to those described in Step 2A above. Additionally, the operational planner should consider PSYOP-related intelligence obtained from the "Country Team" located within the contingency region.<sup>34</sup> Again, this EC portion of the CES should focus on what PSYOP-related actions the enemy is physically capable of doing. Next, the operational planner should relate PSYOP with COAs.

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<sup>31</sup>Joint Pub 3-13.1, I-4.

<sup>32</sup>U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations in Panama during Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY*, 23.

<sup>33</sup>FM 33-1, 2-3.

<sup>34</sup>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 16 June 1995), IV-8.

### **COURSES OF ACTION (Step 2C):**

The goal of this step is the development of a list of mutually independent COAs for the mission or each phase of an operation. PSYOP plays a very big role in this stage and is even emphasized in the PSYOP Staff Officer's Guide as PSYOP integration "on the ground floor."<sup>35</sup> The operational planner searches for ways PSYOP can accomplish the mission and lists them as a COA. Again, the original "objectives" and "target audiences" discussed in Step 1 are crucial. The commander should have distinct options from all available assets. This includes posing PSYOP COAs if applicable.

In developing specific PSYOP COAs, the operational planner should focus on the weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities of the enemy forces. Specifically, issues such as morale and troop discipline are important. Again, this process draws heavily on the intel assessments. At this stage, a planner lists each individual PSYOP COA which would, by itself, accomplish the mission OR significantly aid another non-PSYOP COA in accomplishing the mission. Note, including a PSYOP COA which would not, by itself, accomplish the mission, is a slight variation in the normal CES process. The resulting PSYOP COAs are now checked for initial feasibility, and acceptability. Feasibility focuses on the availability of PSYOP-related assets while acceptability often concentrates on time considerations discussed earlier.

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<sup>35</sup>4th PSYOP GROUP(A), *Psychological Operations Staff Officer's Guide*, (n.p.: n.p., September 1993), 17.

### **ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION (Step 3):**

Psychological operations constitute a war-fighting function that can remove troops and units from the enemy's order of battle as effectively as bullets and bombs...<sup>36</sup>

Comparing COAs to ECs (COA wargaming) requires planners to develop a set of Measures of Effectiveness(MOE). Developing PSYOP related MOEs provides the most difficult step in the CES. The only methodology available for developing PSYOP MOEs is the subjective integration of objective data obtained from lessons learned reports. These lessons learned can then be translated into a ballpark percentage for comparison--Again, not an easy task. MOE's will be different for each type of conflict. Examples of possible PSYOP-related MOE's include: (1) favorable image projected, (2) Post-hostility success probability, (3) public support attainment, (4) attrition rates(e.g. relative combat power), (5) time requirement for mission accomplishment, and (5) percentage of people leaving government controlled areas.

A review of DS/DS indicates that of all the Iraqi Enemy Prisoners of War(EPW) interviewed: 98% were exposed to some form of U.S./Coalition PSYOP effort; 88% "believed" the U.S./Coalition PSYOP message; and 70% were influenced to take the action desired by the U.S./Coalition PSYOP theme.<sup>37</sup> Recall that, at this point, the planner compares both PSYOP, non-PSYOP and supporting-

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<sup>36</sup>Robert B. Adolph Jr., "PSYOP: Gulf War Force Multiplier," *Army*, December 1992, 17.

<sup>37</sup>James P. Noll, "The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW) during mobilization, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and Demobilization," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 10 May 1993), 129.



PSYOP COAs. Albeit a subjective interpretation, the operational commander must include these PSYOP COAs in this analysis. Alternatively, in the MOOTW scenario, Major General Charles E Wilhelm, Commander of U.S. Marine Forces in Somalia, described PSYOP as "a combat subtractor...they reduced the amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight."<sup>38</sup> Additionally, as an added procedure in the step, the planner should rate each of the non-PSYOP COAs in terms of psychological impact on the enemy (e.g. will it help or hinder the friendly mission?).<sup>39</sup> Finally, the purpose for carrying the PSYOP-supporting COAs through this step is to set up COAs for future "post-hostilities" action. Many planners fail to take this into account during the CES. PSYOP can play a very beneficial role in this area. Next, the retained COAs are analyzed with governing factors.

#### **COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION (Step 4):**

At this stage of the CES, the operational planner lists his remaining COAs; PSYOP, PSYOP-support, and non-PSYOP. Next, a set of PSYOP-specific "governing factors" are generated to conduct a weighted comparison of all the COAs. Many of the factors common to non-PSYOP COAs are applicable for PSYOP COAs as well. A sample of these governing factors include: objective, decisiveness, cooperation, flexibility, simplicity, economy of force, security, synchronization, least own losses, C2, communications, intel, terrain, climate, transportation, deception, logistical support, relative combat power, facilitation of future combat missions, and post-hostilities time/effort considerations. All non-

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<sup>38</sup>Charles P. Borchini and Mark Borstelmann, "Psyops in Somalia: The Voice of Hope," *Special Warfare*, October 1994, 6.

<sup>39</sup>4th PSYOP GROUP(A), 17.

PSYOP COAs must also be compared with their potential impact on PSYOP target audiences.

In addition to those governing factors listed above, several additional factors must also be validated/weighed against PSYOP-only COAs. These factors can be recalled by the acronym "SAVE"(Susceptibility, Accessibility, Vulnerability, and Effectiveness). Susceptibility measures the degree in which the target audience will filter the messages they receive.<sup>40</sup> Holt and van de Velde state "man is not a cork adrift on a stormy ocean of propaganda, yielding passively to the strongest and most persistent currents."<sup>41</sup> Accessibility is the ability or ease at which the target audience can get access to the theme.<sup>42</sup> Vulnerability classifies the unfulfilled needs by the target audience and their liability towards U.S. PSYOP themes. Motivation, stress, and perception all play a role in this factor.<sup>43</sup> Finally, Effectiveness relates to the ability of the target audience to actually perform the behavior response desired in the PSYOP objective.<sup>44</sup> Once all of the weighted comparisons are complete, the operational planner chooses the desired COA. Note, however, if the chosen COA is a non-PSYOP COA, the planner must ensure that ANY supported PSYOP COAs are also brought forward as well.

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<sup>40</sup>Herminio Torres Jr., "Managing Meaning: The Role of Psychological Operations and Public Diplomacy in a National Information Warfare Strategy", Unpublished Research Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: December 1995, 15.

<sup>41</sup>Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 51.

<sup>42</sup>FM 33-1-1, 6-9.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 6-7.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 6-6.

### **THE DECISION (Step 5):**

During this "decision step" the operational planner must restate the selected COA and ensure the questions of (who, what, when, where, how, and why) are stated. Next, the Concept of Operations(CONOPS) is constructed for each chosen COA. Note that this is where the planner restates the COA and ANY PSYOP-supporting COAs carried through from step 4. Once the CONOPS is completed and approved, the operational planner will build PSYOP into the CAMPAIGN PLAN, OPLAN, CONPLAN, or OPORDER as required.

### **CONCLUSION:**

PSYOP derive their effectiveness from being an integral part of the operation from start to finish. They are not substitutes for combat power, but they may significantly enhance the combat unit's mission accomplishment.<sup>45</sup>

PSYOP, integrated early in the joint military planning process, can act as a force multiplier in the full military continuum. Revised joint PSYOP publications, reorganized PSYOP C2 structure, streamlined PSYOP approval authority criteria, and assignment of career PSYOP officers to the CINC J-3 staff will boost the corporate knowledge of PSYOP capability and limitations toward mission planning. However, these steps alone only provide a partial solution. In order to prevent a "shot-gun" approach towards PSYOP implementation in all scenarios, the operational planner must build PSYOP directly into the CES. The result--a synergized decision for the operational commander.

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<sup>45</sup>FM 33-1-1, 2-5.

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